How Did Lewis Prevail?

James Gray Pope is Professor of Law & Sidney Reitman Scholar at Rutgers University. Prof. Pope has written extensively on depression era labor law and history including the article,
The Western Pennsylvania Coal Strike of 1933, Part II: Lawmaking From Above and the Demise of Democracy in the United Mine Workers.


In this article, Pope dissects John L. Lewis' strategy to thwart pro-democracy unionists and enhance his own power:

"Lacking support among the miners, Lewis formed alliances with coal operators. In Illinois, the contracts that had been 'ratified' by fiat in 1932 was due to expire in March 1933. Although the PMA had majority support in many mines, (and probably in the state as a whole), Lewis sat down with the Illinois Coal Operators Association and negotiated a two-year extension until April 1935. Calling this agreement an 'emergency measure,' Lewis refused to submit it to the miners for ratification. The operators then decline to deal with the PMA on the ground that they were under contract to the UMW. Thus, PMA members were presented with the choice of accepting representation by the UMW or striking. In most areas, local government responded by prohibiting assemblies and picketing by both unions, a superficially neutral policy that hampered PMA protests and protected UMW contracts." (p. 257)

And while Section 7 (a) of the newly enacted National Industrial Recovery Act should have protected the rights of Illinois miners to join the union of their choice, jurisdiction over the PMA's dispute was bounced between the courts and the regional board of the National Bituminous Coal Labor Board. In PMA President Claude Pearcy's words, the stalemate left the PMA with "no legal rights except to occupy the status of a lemon to be squeezed by Johnson and his so-called labor boards." (p. 259) (General Hugh S. Johnson was the administrator of the National Recovery Administration.)

The complete article is available from Labor History, Volume 44