How Did Lewis Prevail?

James Gray Pope is Professor of Law & Sidney Reitman Scholar at Rutgers University. Prof. Pope has written extensively on depression era labor law and history including the article,
The Western Pennsylvania Coal Strike of 1933, Part II: Lawmaking From Above and the Demise of Democracy in the United Mine Workers.


In this article, Pope dissects John L. Lewis' strategy to thwart pro-democracy unionists and enhance his own power:

"Lacking support among the miners, Lewis formed alliances with coal operators. In Illinois, the contracts that had been 'ratified' by fiat in 1932 was due to expire in March 1933. Although the PMA had majority support in many mines, (and probably in the state as a whole), Lewis sat down with the Illinois Coal Operators Association and negotiated a two-year extension until April 1935. Calling this agreement an 'emergency measure,' Lewis refused to submit it to the miners for ratification. The operators then decline to deal with the PMA on the ground that they were under contract to the UMW. Thus, PMA members were presented with the choice of accepting representation by the UMW or striking. In most areas, local government responded by prohibiting assemblies and picketing by both unions, a superficially neutral policy that hampered PMA protests and protected UMW contracts." (p. 257)

And while Section 7 (a) of the newly enacted National Industrial Recovery Act should have protected the rights of Illinois miners to join the union of their choice, jurisdiction over the PMA's dispute was bounced between the courts and the regional board of the National Bituminous Coal Labor Board. In PMA President Claude Pearcy's words, the stalemate left the PMA with "no legal rights except to occupy the status of a lemon to be squeezed by Johnson and his so-called labor boards." (p. 259) (General Hugh S. Johnson was the administrator of the National Recovery Administration.)

The complete article is available from Labor History, Volume 44

What Is Community-Based Unionism?

Studying the mine war, it can be easy to focus on the the sensational violence and yet overlook the important principles which were contested. Certainly with the theft of the wage referendum ballots, the democratic rights of the rank-and-file had been usurped. But the formation of the Progressive Miners of America also heralded a model of unionism that was structurally different than its predecessor.

This alternative unionism or community-based unionism is discussed in Staughton Lynd's book, "We Are All Leaders", The Alternative Unionsim of the Early 1930's. In the introduction, Lynd writes, "By whatever name, this alternative unionism was democratic, deeply rooted in mutual aid among workers in different crafts and work sites, and politically independent. The key to the value system of alternative unionism was its egalitarianism." (p. 3) Contrasted to bureaucratic unionism in which power is wielded from the top and tactics and decision-making are handled by national leaders, alternative unionism is characterized by a horizontal formation of rank-and-file workers who actively participate in most aspects of the union. Further, adherents to alternative unionism tend to view their constituency across a broad class spectrum while bureaucratic unionism tends to function more narrowly within the immediate concerns of its membership and contracts.

In the 1930's, this division was heightened considerably due to John L. Lewis' paternalistic leadership of the UMWA. Arguably, the PMA was attempting to uphold and formalize a nascent form of community unionism which grew within the Illinois coal fields for decades. With Lewis' ascendancy to the UMWA presidency in 1920 came a relentless push to centralize union authority under his auspices.